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Thispart of humanphilosophy which regards logic is disagreeable to the
taste of many, as appearing to them no more than a net and a snare of
thorny subtlety .... But if we would rate things according to their real
worth, the rational sciences are the keys to all the rest.
-Francis Bacon
"Contrariwise, " continued Tweedledee, "f it was so, it might be, and if
it were so, it would be, but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic. "
-Lewis Carroll
It is nearly an article of faith of contemporary legal thinking that the
law is not logical. The law involves complex considerations of justice,
history, equity, facts, social customs, and economics. It cannot, as the
saying goes, be reduced to a syllogism. Greater minds than ours have
echoed the famous dicta "a page of history is worth a volume of
logic,"' and "the life of the law is not logic but experience."2  As a
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1. The actual quote is: "Upon this point a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New
York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
2. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1 (1938) [hereinafter cited as HOLMES]. But see E.
COKE, 1 INSTITUTEs 138: "Reason is the Life of the Law." Holmes' famous quote is quite similar
to Rudolf von Jhering's comments on the civil law:
This desire for logic that turns jurisprudence into legal mathematics is an error and
arises from misunderstanding law. Life does not exist for the sake of concepts but con-
cepts for the sake of life. It is not logic that is entitled to exist but what is claimed by life,
by social relations, by the sense ofjustice-and logical necessity, or logical impossibility,
is immaterial.
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result, from the opening moment of law school the words "thinking like
a lawyer" and "legal reasoning" are used to convey a totally unique
problem solving process.
This is truly unfortunate. In the first place, legal reasoning-di-
vorced from traditional descriptions of analysis-is very difficult to de-
fine, difficult to teach, and all but impossible for the beginner to
understand. In the second place, logical analysis can provide the law-
yer and the law Student with tools that greatly enhance their critical
and persuasive abilities. Without explanations of how these tools can
be used, the quality of legal reasoning suffers.
This paper describes exactly how logic and the law can and do meet.
It begins with a sort of jurisprudential digression to provide a context
for the discussion of logic and legal reasoning. There is a great deal of
misunderstanding in this area. Then follows a very practical descrip-
tion of how logic and legal reasoning relate. The emphasis is on what
can be learned by first year law students in their legal methods courses,
so the discussion is very straightforward and nonphilosophical. There
has been enough discussion in vague philosophical terms about the role
of logic in the law.3
A SHORT DIGRESSION: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Why Is Logic Not Taught in Law School?
The idea of teaching traditional logic to law students does not seem
to be very popular. Not one current casebook on legal method, legal
process, or the like contains a chapter on logic.4 Only one text on legal
writing, by Brand and White, contains even a list of common informal
fallacies.' The subject seems to have been relegated to the area ofjuris-
prudence, and even there only in vague and often deprecating generali-
ties.
6
Quoted in Stein, Logic and Experience in Roman and Common Law, 59 B.U.L. REV. 433, 437
(1979).
3. See Loevinger, An Introduction to Legal Logic, 27 IND. L.J. 471, 471-82 (1952) for an
excellent summary of the literature on this subject.
4. Among the casebooks I have checked are H. JONES, J. KERNOCHAN & A. MURPHY, LE-
GAL METHOD: CASES AND TEXT MATERIALS (1980); R. LoVINGTON, E. STASON, J. WADE, E.
CHEATHAM & T. SMEDLEY, CASES AND MATERIALS FOR A COURSE ON LEGAL METHODS (1969);
M. ROMBAUER, LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING: ANALYSIS, RESEARCH AND WRITING (1978); W.
STATSKY & R. WERNET, CASE ANALYSIS AND FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL WRITING (1977). One
casebook includes a couple of articles that contain passing, deprecating remarks about the role of
logic in the law. W. FRYER & H. ORENTLICHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGAL METHOD
AND LEGAL SYSTEM 63-64, 408-10, 453-54 (1967). An undergraduate casebook, however, does
contain an interesting, albeit brief, comparison of logical and legal reasoning. H. BERMAN & W.
GREINER, THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW 413-24 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BERMAN &
GREINER].
5. N. BRAND & J. WHITE, LEGAL WRITING: THE STRATEGY OF PERSUASION (1976).
6. Eg., W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
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There seem to be two reasons for this state of affairs. First, there is a
great deal of misunderstanding of what logic is all about. Most writers
describe logic as if it consisted solely of Aristotelian deductions.7
Others cower at the thought of logic being comprised of useless and
complicated symbolic perambulations wholly unrelated to common
thought processes.' Small wonder that logic is avoided in law school
classrooms.
Second, there is a grand "legal realist" tradi tion of twentieth century
jurisprudence that legal reasoning cannot be described in terms of
traditional logic. Legal reasoning is thought to be sui generis, a unique
form of problem solving. Holmes' comments on the role of logic in
legal reasoning are well known, perhaps too much so.9 Other names
could be added to the list: Cardozo,'
0 Stone,1' Frank,' 2 and Pound.'
3
All of these men have been quoted at one time or another to support
the view that logic is all but useless in the legal reasoning process. The
"old tradition," says Cohen, "is that law is law, and has nothing to do
with any other field of human inquiry."'
14
LAW AND LEGAL METHOD 467-73 (1972); E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY
AND METHOD OF THE LAW 331-38 (1974); J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE
NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 806-10 (1973). Some texts devote more than pass-
ing references to the subject. See, e-g., COHEN AND COHEN'S READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 397-487 (P. Shuchman ed. 1979); J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION
OF LAW, LAW AS LOGIC, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL: A STUDY IN JURISPRUDENCE 137-214
(1950) [hereinafter cited as STONE]. The most complete treatment of law and logic may be found
in J. HALL, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 341-94, 539-642 (1938) [hereinafter cited as HALL].
Only Hall does not presume a working knowledge of the principles of syllogistic and analogical
reasoning. Instead he provides articles that explain basic logical principles before delving into
their value in legal reasoning.
7. All of Holmes' remarks on logic, for example, refer solely to deduction. See text accom-
panying notes 24-36 infra.
8. Professor Edwin Patterson, for example, thought that traditional logic had become too
"abstract and complex" to have any application in law. Patterson thought that instead of tradi-
tional logical analysis, Dewey's 'instrumental logic"--which involved more psychology of prob-
lem solving than logic-was the proper scientific method to apply to legal analysis. See generally
Patterson, Logic in The Law, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 875, 889-94 (1942).
9. In addition to the remarks quoted at notes I and 2 supra, there are other well known
Holmesian aphorisms on logic and law. For example "[Tihe whole outline of the law is the resul-
tant of a conflict between logic and good sense. . ." and 'The law embodies the story of a na-
tion's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics." Holmes, supra note 2, at 5. See also Holmes,
7he Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465-66 (1897): "The language of judicial decision is
mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty
and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not
the destiny of man..."
10. See generally Hynes v. New York Central R. Co., 231 N.Y. 229, 131 N.E. 898 (1920).
Cardozo, however, considered logic-or as he termed it "the method of philosophy"--to be one of
several useful tools of legal problem solving. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 31-50 (1949).
11. See STONE, supra note 6, at 137-46.
12. See generally J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) [hereinafter cited as
FRANK].
13. See generally Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908) [hereinaf-
ter cited as POUND].
14. Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 HARV. L. REv. 622, 623 (1916). I suppose there
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Aside from espousing this rather elitist perspective of our profession,
critics rely on a number of weaknesses of logical method itself to sup-
port the idea that it has no value in legal inquiries. What are these
shortcomings of logic? Critics have filled volumes with discussions of
these points, 5 so I will certainly not be able to give just treatment to
them all, but a short summary will provide a general idea.
1. Logic is concerned with form and not with truth. Perfectly ridic-
ulous arguments may be logically correct. The law, in contrast, is con-
cerned with attaining justice. Logic cannot guarantee arrival at a just
conclusion, only a valid one.
16
2. The same set of facts may yield any number of perfectly logical
solutions, without giving a clue as to which alternative is the best solu-
tion. 
17
3. The use of logic as a mode of problem solving introduces resist-
ance to change. As Pound remarked, "The effect of all systems is apt to
be petrification of the subject systematized."'" New approaches to
problem solving are discouraged. Independence of thought becomes
stifled.
4. Logic is simply not used in day-to-day judicial decision-mak-
ing.19
is a third reason for not teaching the basics of argument. Many teachers probably think students
should have picked up this information earlier in their education. Law school, for these teachers,
is no place for such basics. The same reasoning has been used to object to undue emphasis on
teaching basic writing skills at the law school level. The problem, of course, is that if law schools
do not teach these basics we graduate incompetents, people who can recite the elements of larceny
by heart but who cannot string sentences together in clear, logical English.
15. There are a number of books devoted to evaluating the role of logic and legal reasoning.
Most, though not all, foctis on deduction and are highly critical. Probably the best is C. MORRIS,
How LAWYERS THINK (1938). Others include N. MCCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL
THEORY (1978); M. RADIN, LAW AS LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE (1971); R. WASSERSTRoM, THE JU-
DICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1961) [hereinafter cited as
WASSERSTROM].
16. "Logic, in short, is concerned with implication, not with proof, and the conclusions of
logic are always subject to the risk that the premisses [sic] may be proved to be not true, or in the
law either not true or not just." STONE, supra note 6, at 137-38. See also FRANK, Supra note 12, at
66; E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 24 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
PATTERSON].
17. This problem was identified by Matthew Hale rather early on (1668): "[M]en agreeing il
the same common notions of justice and morality often times deduce different conclusions from
them, and applications to them, even although interest and partiality of mind do not inter-
pose . . ." Quoted in HALL, supra note 6, at 342. The sterling example of this problem was
delineated by Cardozo in Hynes v. New York CentralA Co., 231 N.Y. 229, 131 N.E. 898 (1920).
A more contemporary and detailed analysis is presented in HALL, supra note 6, at 356-63. For
that matter pick up almost any hornbook on any subject. Contradictory rules set side-by-side are
commonplace.
18. POUND, supra note 13, at 606. Pound continues: "Perfection of scientific system and
exposition tends to cut off individual initiative in the future, to stifle independent consideration of
new problems and of new phases of old problems, and to impose the ideas of one generation upon
another." Id. See generalo FRANK, supra note 12, at 67-68; PATTERSON, supra note 16, at 25; and
STONE, supra note 6, at 142.
19. "The deductive theory is an inadequate, quite inaccurate account of the way in which
courts really have decided cases. Courts both past and present have clearly not invoked a formal
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At first blush, these may seem like weighty criticisms. Indeed, it is
not hard to understand, if we do not investigate these sources further,
why logic has fallen into such a state of disrepute in legal education.
B. Providing a Better Context: Why Teach Logic in Law School?
We must look closer at the reasons for avoiding logic in law school.
In so doing we will find that there is a great deal of misunderstanding
about the nature of logical analysis, and that many supposed critics of
logic in the law actually direct their barbs, not at logic itself, but at a
small portion of it, namely deduction. Furthermore, we will find that
the criticisms are not designed in large measure to remove logic from
legal reasoning but to remove bad logic from legal reasoning.
About the nature of logic: the term "logic" covers a multitude of
proverbial sins. For centuries it referred to Aristotle's analysis by syllo-
gism, the science of deduction.2" Years later, Francis Bacon and subse-
quently John Stuart Mill defined and expanded logic to include
induction, the methods of analogy, and determination of causes.2 At
the turn of this last century, something of a revolution in intellectual
history occurred. A totally symbolic mathematical logic developed in
this context. 22 This in turn has been refined and expanded to an amaz-
ing degree by the computer revolution of the latter half of this cen-
tury.
23
Logic, then, means syllogisms; it also means truth tables; it is modus
tollens and moduspodens; it is the fallacy of the slippery slope. To say
then that logic is too complicated and comprehensive a subject to teach
in law school is not totally off the mark. And to remark that logic does
not seem to be a practical way of defining legal reasoning is not totally
inaccurate.
But we are not faced here with an all-or-nothing proposition. I am
not advocating a definition of legal problems based on logic alone, or
the use of complicated analytical techniques to resolve sometimes basic
disputes. I am, however, saying that there are portions of this science
procedure by which cases are adjudicated in accordance with rules; on. the contrary, their method-
ology has been and continues to be distinctively nondeductive." WASSERSTROM, supra note 15, at
16. See text accompanying notes 48-50 infra.
20. The classic analysis of the syllogism is found in Aristotle's 4nalyica Priora. See 1 THE
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (W. Ross ed. 1928).
21. Although Mill got most of the credit, the principles of induction were not created by him.
Francis Bacon two centuries earlier described in great part what became known as "Mil's Meth-
ods." Indeed, there is mention of induction in the writings of early Greek philosophers. Mill's
classic treatise is A SYSTEM OF LOOIC (1848) [hereinafter cited as MILL].
22. The major work in this area is A. WHITEHEAD & B. RussELL, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA
(1910).
23. For a fascinating-if unorthodox-examination of formal logic, artificial intelligence,
and the future, see generally D. HOFSTADER, GoDEL, ESCHER, BACH (1980).
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of logic-fairly simple portions-that can be used as tools in legal rea-
soning, indeed, that are used as reasoning tools on a day-to-day basis.
Much of what is currently taught in logic classes is entirely too cumber-
some for analysis. However, there are certain techniques, namely de-
duction, induction and analogy, and the avoidance of informal
fallacies, that can easily be taught to first-year students, that do have a
direct bearing on the legal reasoning process, and that can definitely
improve the quality of reasoning and critical thinking skills exhibited
by students and lawyers alike. The definitions and applications of
these different logical processes are addressed later in this article. Suf-
fice it to say at this point that there is much about legal reasoning that is
quite logical, and the understanding of basic principles of logic can fa-
cilitate, to a great extent, our understanding of legal reasoning.
About the jurisprudence context and the remarks of our great legal
minds: I would like to suggest that to the extent that we read the works
of the likes of Holmes, Cardozo, Stone, Frank, Pound, and others as
advocating a jurisprudence or a system of legal reasoning devoid of
logic, we make them roll in their coffins. I think that to a great extent
the reason for the absence of logic in law school is a mistaken reliance
on the works and words of these men. Their writings in general, and
their remarks on the role of logic in particular, must be placed in
proper context.
In the nineteenth century a major upheaval occurred that shook the
foundations of arts and sciences. Until approximately the midpoint of
the 1800's, intellectual thought was dominated by the idea that by de-
duction and deduction alone man could describe the workings of the
universe.24 Implicit in this attitude were a couple of important assump-
tions. First, that all of the premises are absolute and identified; and
second, that deduction provides the sole analytical tool. This tradi-
tional perspective was shattered when scientists began to realize that
their self-evident assumptions were no longer so self-evident. Mathe-
maticians discovered that the time honored postulates of Euclidean ge-
ometry comprised only one way of viewing mathematics, that, for
example, perhaps parallel lines do meet somewhere.25 Einstein shat-
24. See Cook, Scient fc Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303 (1929), for a very readable
summary of the intellectual revolution that occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
25. Euclid presented geometry as a set of deductions necessarily following from certain axi-
oms or postulates. One of those postulates-the so-called "parallel postulate"--said, in a nutshell,
that parallel lines do not intersect. For two thousand years, mathematicians attempted to prove
the logical validity of this postulate. In the early nineteenth century, several European mathema-
ticians attempted to prove this postulate by demonstrating the invalidity of a system based on the
contradictory of the parallel postulate, namely a system based on the assumption that parallel
lines do meet. To their surprise, the system based on the negation of the parallel postulate turned
out to be as consistent and logical as the system based on Euclid's parallel postulate. Which
system accurately describes the universe? Who knows? (Or as my wife says, "who cares?"). For
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tered common assumptions about the physical world with his now well
known theory of relativity.26 Darwin destroyed the notion of a static
environment with his theories of adaptation and natural selection.27
Nothing, it seemed, could be viewed as absolute anymore.
This revolution was not limited to the sciences. It crept into the law
as well. 28 Consider this classic statement of the nineteenth century po-
sition:
Every judicial act resulting in a judgment consists of a pure deduc-
tion. The figure of its reasoning is the stating of a rule to certain
facts, a finding that the facts of the particular case are those certain
facts, and the application of the rules a logical necessity. . . .The
rule of law and its application may be reached in a thousand differ-
ent ways but a judgment of a court is always this pure deduction.29
Here, as stated for the case of nineteenth century thought in general, we
have two assumptions. First, that the premises-in this case the rules
of law--exist apart from and antecedent to the findings of facts. Sec-
ond, that once again deduction is the only applicable analytical
method. Law becomes a process of simply locating the correct preexist-
ing rule and applying it to the facts. It is not hard to understand why
Pound called this "mechanical jurisprudence."30 It is also not hard to
fairly simple explanations of the development of non-Euclidean geometry see K. BORsVK & W.
SZMIELEW, FOUNDATIONS OF GEOMETRY 1-6 (1960) and R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF Mo-
TORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 254-58 (1974). Pirsig, by the way, thinks the question "Who cares?" is
perceptive. The question of which system is right, he says, has no meaning: "As well ask whether
the metric system is true and the avoirdupois system is false. . . .One geometry cannot be more
true than another, it can only be more convenient." Id. at 257 (emphasis added).
26. A. EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY: THE SPECIAL AND GENERAL THEORY (1961). This volume is
supposed to be "a clear explanation that anyone can understand." Einstein, however, overesti-
mated what "anyone" can understand. Probably a better introduction-well-illustrated and with
numerous simple examples-is E. TAYLOR & J. WHEELER, SPACETIME PHYSICS (1966).
27. See generally C. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION
(Mod. Lib. ed. 1936). "The prestige of biology [Darwin] caused men whose thinking was influ-
enced by science to apply biological rather than mechanistic categories to the world.. . .The
conception of organism came to be thought the key to both scientific and philosophical explana-
tions of natural laws, and the atomic thinking of the eighteenth century came to be regarded as out
of date." B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 727 (1972).
28. "Especially in the 18th and 19th centuries many western jurists sought to make legal
reasoning conform to syllogistic logic. . . .[I]t was supposed by many that if the entire body of
law could be summarized in a set of rules, the sole remaining task of law would be to classify
particular facts under one rule or another." BERMAN & GREINER, supra note 4, at 415. See also
COHEN, supra at 624-27; WESSERSTROM, supra note 15, at 15.
29. Zane, German LegalPhilosophy, 16 MICH. L. REV. 287, 338 (1918). See also H. SEARLES,
LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 306-09 (1956). Some judges actually attempted to decide their
cases on pure deduction. Consider the remarks of a Maryland judge in a nineteenth century
opinion:
Obviously a principle, if sound, ought to be applied wherever it logically leads, without
reference to ulterior results. That it may in consequence operate in some instances with
apparent or even real harshness and severity does not indicate that it is inherently
erroneous. Its consequences in special cases can never impeach its accuracy.
Gluck v. Baltimore, 81 Md. 315, 325, 32 A. 515, 517 (1895).
30. "The idea of science as a system of deductions has become obsolete and the revolution
which has taken place in other sciences in this regard must take place and is taking place in
jurisprudence also." POUND, supra note 13, at 608.
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understand the criticisms and vituperations of the great legal minds of
this century when we realize that it is against this backdrop that they
pronounced the limitations of logic.3' These fellows were merely
sounding the same sorts of alarms as the non-Euclidean mathemati-
cians, the relativistic physicists, and the Darwinian biologists did in
their respective fields. First, we can no longer be assured that our
premises are absolute, even accurate. That is, we cannot be confident
that all the rules of law already exist. Law, like other aspects of the
universe, is forever changing. To think that the law can be catalogued
in a time capsule is ridiculous. Second, deduction cannot possibly
therefore be the sole method of reasoning. If we cannot trust our prem-
ises then what good is the formal validity of our arguments?
It is in this historical context that we must understand Holmes, for
example, when he says that "general propositions do not decide con-
crete cases . ,. 2 It is not logic that is in and of itself execrable. It is
excessive reliance on deduction alone as a decision-making problem-
solving crutch.
To be sure, much of the problem in interpreting the jurisprudence of
this century is that writers more often than not have overstated their
cases, and then some.33 Frank, for instance, devotes the better part of
an entire volume berating decision-making by deduction and relegates
to two one-sentence footnotes his ideas as to the great value of and the
proper role of the syllogism.34 One reads a lot of Holmesian "history
vs. logic" before stumbling on the qualifier that logic is yet an impor-
tant aspect of legal reasoning, the problem simply being that "there is a
fallacy in trusting too much this tool."'35 Pound, too, criticizes mechani-
cal jurisprudence but only provides one reference-that logic must be
an "instrument"-to the proper role of traditional analysis.36
The idea remains, though. There is an important role for logic in the
legal reasoning process, a role that should be defined, and taught to law
students and lawyers alike.
WHAT KIND OF LOGIC?
The question at this point becomes what exactly is the proper role of
31. This is, in fact, the issue that is largely responsible for the development of the so-called
legal realist philosophy. See T. BENDITT, LAW AS RULE AND PRINCIPLE: PROBLEMS OF LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 2 (1978); WASSERSTROM, supra note 15, at 2.
32. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
- 33. As Patterson said, "[Llogic was made the whipping boy for the faults of nineteenth cen-
tury political beliefs." PATTERSON, supra note 16, at 24.
34. The two footnotes may be found at FRANK, supra note 12, at 68 and 131.
35. Quoted in MARTIN, LEOES SINE LOGICA VANAE, IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPO-
SiUM 312 (S. Hook ed. 1964) (emphasis added).
36. POUND, supra note 13, at 610.
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logic in the legal reasoning process? The answer to this depends on the
type of logic involved. What follows is a summary of a few of the
traditional logical techniques that I have found to be useful in both
participating in legal reasoning and in teaching the process to first-year
students. The various methods are briefly defined. A few examples
from common experience and the legal world are offered to clarify, and
a description of the uses of this principle in legal reasoning is proferred.
There are certainly more applications of logic to the legal reasoning
process than those I describe.3 7 With this in mind I would like to sug-
gest that it is useful to discuss the basics of three different aspects of
logical analysis: deduction, induction, and some common informal fal-
lacies of "rhetoric." I should emphasize that I will only discuss basics,
particularly when deduction is concerned. In the first place, there is
probably insufficient time to educate law students about the finer points
of logical analysis, and I am concerned about logic chiefly as a subject
to be taught. In the second place, I am not convinced that anything
more than some elementary principles are necessary for our purposes,
for reasons I describe in greater detail as I define each particular




Traditionally, logical inference is separated into two categories: de-
ductive and inductive. Deductive reasoning is invariably illustrated by
the following example taken from Aristotle:
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore Socrates is a mortal.
37. I have, for example, devoted my attention exclusively to case law reasoning. An entirely
different matter is the drafting, interpretation, and application of statutes. Professor Laymen Al-
len suggested that symbolic logic might be a useful tool for legal drafting. See Allen, Symbolic
Logic: .4 Razor-Edged Tool for Drafting and Interpreting Legal Documents, 66 YALE L.J. 833
(1957). Professor Allen's methods are, however, a bit complicated, and the documents drafted by
the methods are not always easy to read even though they are logically correct. For these reasons,
the usefulness of symbolic logic in legal drafting has come under fire. See, e.g., R. FLESCH, How
TO WRITE PLAIN ENGLISH: A BOOK FOR LAWYERS AND CONSUMERS 103-13 (1979);-Summers, .4
Note on Symbolic Logic and the Law, 13 J. LEGAL EDUC. 486 (1961).
Other authors have also attempted to join more complex logic and the law. Felix Cohen, for
example, analyzes the relevance of field-theory to legal decisions in Field Theory and Judicial
Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238 (1950). Ross, Tu-Tu, 70 HARV. L. REv. 812 (1957) delves into semantic
considerations and the law. Formal logic is applied to judicial decision-making in Kayton, Can
Jurimetricrs Be of Value to Jurisprudence?, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 287 (1964). And legal decision-
making models are discussed in Mays & Jones, LegalPolicy Decision Process: Alternative Thinking
and the Predictive Function, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 318, 325 (1964). But the subjects of these
articles are beyond me and beyond the scope of this article.
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The first two terms are called premises, major and minor respectively,
and the last term is labeled the conclusion. The particular form of ex-
pressing arguments in terms of premises and conclusion is called the
syllogism. Syllogisms come in different varieties, depending on the
way the premises are stated. Deduction is, simply stated, an argument
suggesting that a conclusion must follow from the given premises. 38
Induction, by way of contrast, is an argument suggesting that the
conclusion may follow from the premises, but not necessarily.39 A vari-
ation on Aristotle's example will clarify:
Socrates is a man and is mortal.
Plato is a man and is mortal.
Aristotle is a man and is mortal.
Therefore probably all men are mortal.
More on induction later. For now, it is sufficient to understand the
basic terms.
Just because a syllogism asserts only one conclusion does not mean
that this is so or that the asserted conclusion even follows at all. Con-
sider the following:
Liberal democrats are disappearing.
Edward Kennedy is a liberal democrat.
Therefore Edward Kennedy is disappearing.
or
38. Most of what follows is a fairly simple outline of the principles of syllogistic logic. For
greater depth see any of a large number of standard texts on logic. In preparing this article I
found the following texts to be very helpful: J. BRENNAN, A HANDBOOK OF LOGIC (1957) [here-
inafter cited as BRENNAN]; M. COHEN & E. NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION To LOGIC (1962); I. Con,
INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC (4th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Cop]; E. EMMET, HANDBOOK OF
LOGIC (1979); H. KAHANE, LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY: A MODERN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as KAHANE]; and SEARLEs, supra note 29.
I should also hasten to add that my discussion of deduction, in addition to being quite simpli-
fied, is very limited. There is much more to deduction than the syllogism, as even the most cur-
sory glance at a modem logic text book will indicate. My main interest, however, is in what is
most useful in terms of legal reasoning and in what first-year law students can grasp with little
difficulty. This limits the scope of applicable logic considerably.
39. Induction is not, contrary to popular opinion, reasoning from particulars to generaliza-
tions. Although it often involves this sequence of reasoning it may also include reasoning from
particular to particular or even general to particular. For example, the argument
Politician John Lansburg made promises in 1968, 1972, and- 1973 that he did not intend
to keep.
Therefore Lansburg probably does not intend to keep his promises made in 1980.
moves from particular to particular, yet it is inductive. Likewise, the argument
So far, all Democratic candidates for President have been to the left of Ronald Reagan.
Therefore the next Democratic candidate for President will be to the left of Ronald Rea-
gan.
reasons from general to particular and remains inductive. The same idea applies to deduction,
too. It is not merely reasoning from general to particular. The argument
All Republican politicans are to the right of Ted Kennedy.
Therefore all who are not to the right of Ted Kennedy are not Republican politicians.
moves from general to general and is a valid deduction. The examples are taken from H.
KAHANE, LOGIC AND CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC: THE USE OF REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 6 (3d
ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC]. See also Copi, supra note 38, at 23-
26.
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All casebooks are books intended for careful study.
Some comic books are books intended for careful study.
Therefore some comic books are casebooks.
In both of these examples the conclusions do not necessarily follow
from the given premises. They are referred to as "invalid."4 When a
conclusion does necessarily follow from the premises it is termed
"valid." This concept of validity is central to logical analysis and is
important to understand clearly. It refers only to the formal relation-
ship of the premises and conclusion, regardless of the content of the
propositions themselves. Our original syllogism:
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore Socrates is a mortal.
is valid not because of the meaning of the words used, but because of
the relationship of those words. We could, in fact, convert the syllo-
gism into otherwise meaningless symbols and still know that the argu-
ment is valid, without ever knowing what the syllogism actually means.
All M is P.
All S is M.
Therefore all S is P.
Any logician would look at this symbolic representation and pro-
claim it a valid categorical syllogism without knowing what M, P, and
S stand for. Virtually any words could be substituted for the symbols
and the syllogism would remain valid. For example,
All birds are kangaroos.
George Washington is a bird.
Therefore George Washington is a kangaroo.
or
All defendants with orange hair will prevail.
Stu Kowalski is a defendant with orange hair.
Therefore Stu Kowalski will prevail.
Both of these syllogisms are perfectly valid, even though the substi-
tuted terms make the arguments perfectly ridiculous. This leads to an
important point about the nature of valid arguments. Validity refers
only to relationship. It has nothing to do with content. Validity con-
cerns only the form of the arguments. It bears no relation to truth,
justice, or the American Way. Arguments may be logically valid and
absolutely nonsensical. The "truth" or "soundness" of a particular
40. The concept of "validity" is used and defined in various ways. Some writers use the
terms "valid" and "sound" or "true" synonymously. Others give the term "valid" a more limited
definition. I have chosen to keep distinct the concepts of validity and truth, in keeping with the
usage in most logic texts. See Coi, supra note 38, at 32-34.
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valid syllogism will depend on the premises that are used. Once the
premises are selected the logical analysis is a matter of pure mechanics.
When analyzing an argument, therefore, there are several things to
look for. First, analyze the premises. Are they true? Deduction is of
little value here, and resort must be made to other types of analysis.
But it is important nonetheless that the truth of the premises is a crucial
element of a sound deductive argument.
Second, is the argument valid? There are two ways of testing the
validity of a deductive argument. The argument can be tested against a
number of rules and fallacies regarding the form of the syllogism.41
These rules, however, are numerous and a bit difficult to understand,
especially in a short amount of time, so it is probably not practical to
attempt to teach them in their entirety, to first-year students. Further-
more, it is often noted by logicians and lawyers alike that most fallacies
in deduction are fairly obvious once the argument is reduced to a stan-
dard form of syllogism. "Most third-year law students," said Patterson,
"can with little reflection recognize a formally invalid syllogism even if
they cannot say what rule of logic makes it invalid. 42 Consider, for
example, the argument
All crimes are punishable.
Murder is punishable.
Therefore murder is a crime.
It is not necessary to know that this syllogism illustrates the "fallacy of
the undistributed middle" in order to realize that it is not logical.
(Note, too, that it is invalid even though the premises and the conclu-
sion are quite true.).
Even if an argument is not so obvious, there is a relatively simple
method of testing its validity without resort to complicated rules and
fallacies. Simply use the same form and substitute some different
terms. This is often helpful when analyzing more complicated or
lengthy arguments.43 It has been argued:
41. For example, some of the rules for standard categorical syllogisms are that the syllogism
must contain only three terms, the middle of which must be distributed in at least one premise;
that if either premise is negative the conclusion must be negative; that no valid conclusion can be
drawn from two negative premises; and that no particular conclusion can be drawn from two
universal premises. Reading about the rules of valid syllogisms is a natural cure for insomnia.
Probably the easiest explanations to understand are BRENNAN, supra note 38, at 46-50; and Copi,
supra note 38, at 198-206. There is also a very straight-forward explanation of the rules of valid
syllogisms-with exclusively legal examples-in Treusch, The Syllogism [hereinafter cited as
TREUSCH], in HALL, supra note 6, at 539-60.
42. PATTERSON, supra note 16, at 21 (emphasis supplied). See also KAHANE, supra note 38,
at 245. Still, the examples of fallacies in legal opinions described in TREUSCH, supra note 41,
make one wonder.
43. See Copi, supra note 38, at 186.
1981 / Logic for Lawyers
A business affected with a public interest is subject to price regula-
tion.
The business of reselling theatre tickets is not affected with a public
interest.
Therefore the business of reselling theatre tickets is not subject to
price regulation.
44
It may not be clear on the face of things that this is a fallacious argu-
ment (the fallacy of the "illicit major premise"). A simple way to check
the validity of this argument is to reduce the terms to symbols. Thus
the argument boils down to:
All M is P.
No S is M.
Therefore no S is P.
The formula may then be given new, more easy to understand terms
without affecting the validity of the argument at all, since deduction is
purely a matter of form.45 For example:
All cars are expensive.
No diamonds are cars.
(or cars are not diamonds.)
Therefore diamonds are not expensive.
It is easy to see in the substituted argument that the conclusion does not
follow from the premises. Simply because we assert that cars are ex-
pensive we cannot say that cars are the only objects that are expensive.
Likewise, it becomes clearer that in our original example when we say
that a business affected with a public interest is regulated, it does not
follow that other activities cannot be regulated.
2. Application
Of what value is all of this talk about syllogisms and premises and
conclusions? Is this kind of analysis really applicable to legal reason-
ing? The answer is no. And yes.
a. Deduction as a problem solving tool
There is no doubt that legal opinions are extremely amenable to de-
ductive analysis. Nearly every opinion ever written follows the basic
pattern of the standard categorical or hypothetical syllogism. A rule of
44. This example has been lifted from TREUSCH, supra note 41, at 551.
45. There are, of course, inevitable hazards in using this or any type of symbolic approach.
The major problem is that when you translate an argument into syllogistic form, then into sym-
bols, and then into another argument, you increase the possibility of introduced error. The syllo-
gism may not accurately reflect the argument, the symbols may incorrectly represent the syllogism,
and as a result the new argument may bear no resemblance to the original one. This is not to say
that the procedure is not usefuljust be careful. See M. SCRiVEN, REASONING XV (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SCRIVEN].
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law that applies to certain categories of facts is stated (major premise).
The facts of a case are categorized (minor premise). And when the fact
categories of the case coincide with those of the rule then the rule is
applied to those facts (conclusion). For example:
Any person under the age of 16 who has in his possession a firearm
without a license is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Mo Gallo, age 14, has a pistol, but no license.
Therefore Mo Gallo is guilty of a misdemeanor.
This particular example happens to involve a statute, and statutory
problems are particularly. susceptible to syllogistic description. The
same, however, could be said of common law cases:
A person has a right to the fruits of his labor.
Private correspondence is a fruit of the author's labor.
Therefore private correspondence is the property of the author.
4 6
The fact that legal opinions very conveniently can be expressed in
syllogistic form should not be taken as an indication that the syllogism
expresses the way in which the judges actually arrive at their conclu-
sions.47 Deduction is not a very good problem solving technique with
which to begin. Moreover, a deductive analysis simply does not accu-
rately describe the ways in which people in general, and lawyers in
particular, go about solving most of their problems.
The main reason that deduction is of little help in solving legal
problems is that it can only be applied once the premises have been
selected. In the law this is ninety-nine percent of the battle! Properly
categorizing a given set of facts and selecting one of a nearly infinite
variety of rules of law is the toughest part of legal problem solving.
Once the premises-that is, the facts and the rules-have been selected,
the rest of the job is fairly mechanical. Deduction in most cases has
little or nothing to do with the selection of one premise over another.
Here we can recall appropriately the words of Holmes and others that
legal problems cannot be solved by using syllogisms. Here too, we can
cite the list of other weaknesses of decision-making by deduction.48
A more telling reason for not teaching deduction as a legal problem
solving technique is that deduction simply does not accurately describe
the legal reasoning process. Judges do not search the volumes of case
46. Again, I purloined the example from TREUSCH, supra note 41, at 541.
47. To say this would be to commit the fallacy of the false cause. Just because the decision is
accompanied by syllogistic analysis does not mean that the decision was necessarily made by
syllogistic analysis. Other decision-making factors could-and probably are-more important.
The syllogistic argument could be an after-the-fact justification for the decision. See notes 49-51
and accompanying text infra.
48. See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra.
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law for a rule, then categorize the facts, and then reach a conclusion.
Jerome Frank's well-known description is probably closer to the truth:
[S]ince the judge is a human being, and since no human being in his
normal thinking processes arrives at decisions by the route of any
such syllogistic reasoning, it is fair to assume that the judge merely
by putting on the judicial ermine, will not acquire so artificial a
method of reasoning. Judicial judgments, doubtless, in most cases,
are worked out backwards from conclusions tentatively formu-
lated.49
This is certainly not to say that all legal decisions are made by deter-
mining a conclusion and instructing a clerk to find a rationale.50 Not
even a realist like Frank suggests this, although it certainly happens on
occasion. In virtually any legal problem the judge or lawyer or law
student is faced with several possible rules and more than one possible
result. To frame it in the vocabulary of deduction there are several
different possible premises as well as conclusions. The problem solver
will try out each of the combinations. He may adopt one conclusion
and evaluate its several possible premises, and then try out other con-
clusions and other rules. What causes the problem solver to choose a
set of premises and conclusions? Certainly not deduction, for as we
have seen, deduction only functions after the premises have been cho-
sen. A truly accurate answer to this can be supplied only by delving
into the workings of the brain of each problem solver. But it is fair to
say that the factors would include personal philosophy, a sense of eq-
uity, social policy, history, economics, and another type of logic-in-
duction-but not deduction.
51
b. Deduction as a tool of verpication and ofpersuasion
The fact that deduction is of no value in the selection of premises or
the interpretation of facts does not mean that this form of logical analy-
sis is without value in legal reasoning. To the contrary, deduction can
be quite useful, but within certain limits. When a judge, for example,
finally decides upon a rule of law, an interpretation of the facts, and a
conclusion, does he know that the rule and facts are correctly applied?
Reconsider the argument in the price regulations case described above:
49. FRANK, supra note 12, at 101. See also BERMAN AND GREINER, supra note 4, at 416; and
RADIN, supra note 15 at 56-57.
50. The "gastronomical approach" as Prosser calls it. Prosser, Book Review, 13 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 431, 432 (1961).
51. Or as Cardozo stated "[L]ogic [analogy], and history, and custom, and utility, and the
accepted standards of right conduct are the forces which singly or in combination shape the pro-
gress of the law." CARaozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1949). Holmes thought
the factors were "[tihe felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intu-
itions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
fellow-men... ." HOLMES, supra note 2, at 5.
Pacifc Law Journal / Vol 13
A business affected with a public interest is subject to price regula-
tion.
The business of reselling theatre tickets is not affected with a public
interest.
Therefore the business of reselling theatre tickets is not subject to
price regulation.
There is no doubt that the judge correctly stated the rule of law. Like-
wise, there is no problem in his interpretation of the facts. But does the
conclusion in the case follow from the application of the rule to the
facts? Not necessarily, as we have already seen. "Businesses affected
with a public interest" may describe only one of several activities sub-
ject to price regulation, at least given the premises used in the example
case. The judge here could have greatly improved the argument by
either modifying the major premise, the rule of law, ("Onl, a business
affected with a public interest. . . " or more correctly "All businesses
subject to price regulation are businesses affected with a public inter-
est.") provided the modification would not threaten the truth of the
rule, or change the conclusion. It is in verifying, double-checking, and
trouble-shooting that knowledge of the principles of deduction is cru-
cial. Application of the principles of deduction can ensure that
whatever premises are selected are applied correctly. This is the role of
deduction in legal reasoning: to make sure that solutions, however ar-
rived at, are in the end justifiable. It is as John Stuart Mill said a cen-
tury ago:
The value of the syllogistic form and of the rules for using it correctly
does not consist in their being the form and rules according to which
our reasonings are necessarily, or even usually, made; but in their
furnishing us with a mode in which those reasonings may always be
represented and which is admirably calculated, if they are inconclu-
sive, to bring their inconclusiveness to light.
52
And as Jerome Frank said years later,
The conscientious judge, having tentatively arrived at a conclusion
can check up to see whether such a conclusion, without unfair distor-
tion of the facts can be linked with the generalized points of view
theretofore acceptable. If none such are discoverable, he is forced to
consider more acutely whether his tentative decision is wise, both
with respect to the case before him and with respect to possible impli-
cations to future cases.53
52. MILL, supra note 21, at 133.
53. FRAhic, supra note 12, at 131. Numerous authors have joined in this chorus. STONE,
supra note 6, at 145 says that the syllogism is an "indispensible ingredient" in exposing faulty
premises and non-sequiturs. MORRIS, supra at 41, echoes that "traditional logic is a critical rather
than a constructive aid-a technique to diagnose recognized trouble rather than a means of going
to work." See also Adler, Book Review, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 82, 94 (1931); BERMAN & GREINER,
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In legal decision making it is not enough to simply reach a solution.
Centuries of tradition require that most decisions must be explained.
They must be justified. 4 In justifying judicial decisions, it is rarely
sufficient to simply aver "this is the most equitable result." And it is
certainly not acceptable to employ blatantly illogical arguments." Fu-
ture decisions must be based on the reasonings of past decisions. And
if the law is to be consistent, and to some degree predictably applied,
decisions must be logical. Logic after all is little more than the princi-
ples of consistent thinking.56 And the application of some very basic
deductive tools-no more, in fact than the simple principles described
in this article-can greatly improve the consistency of legal thinking.
B. Induction
The second major division into which reasoning is usually divided is
induction. Unlike deduction, which argues that a conclusion must fol-
low from certain premises, induction argues only that a conclusion
probably follows from the premises given.57 Recall the example given
earlier in this article:
Socrates is a man and is mortal.
Plato is a man and is mortal.
Aristotle is a man and is mortal.
Therefore all men are probably mortal.
It does not necessarily follow from the three premises that all men are
mortal. (Indeed, one could cite the life of Enoch, who, according to
Biblical tradition, never died.)5" The only way to ensure the absolute
supra note 4, at 415; C. MORRIS, THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE. LAW 89 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
JUSTIFICATION OF THE LAW]; WASSERSTROM, supra note 15, at 23. Even authors who think the
syllogism does not really provide a method of proof admit that even to organize an argument
according to syllogistic rules makes the argument "almost compelling." See Cook, Book Review,
31 COLUM. L. REv. 82, 115 (1931).
54. "It has been a cardinal rule of the common law... and it is the practice of the modern
civil law that judges should attempt to account for their judicial behaiviour [sic]. A fortiori, it
[logic] is an essential technique of the counsel who must persuade the court to his view of the law."
STONE, supra note 6, at 145. This tradition, of course, is contrary to Lord Mansfield's advice to the
intelligent layman recently appointed to the bench. His advice was to use his common sense and
give his decisions boldly, for the decision would probably be right. But never, he said, give rea-
sons for the decision, since they will almost assuredly be wrong. MILL, supra note 21, at 127.
55. No attorney would relish the thought of appearing before a judge who had a reputation
of being a fine person but incapable of logical reasoning. Likewise, the lawyer who consistently
tenders patently illogical arguments-however equitable the end results might be-will likely
change professions in short order. See Scott, A Plea for the Study of Logic, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC.
206, 207 (1968).
56. See W. HODGES, LOGIC 13-16 (1977).
57. See note 39 supra.
58. According to Genesis 5:24 (New Am. Standard Version): "Enoch walked with God; and
he was not, for God took him." The apostle Paul centuries later reported the traditional interpre-
tation of "took." "Enoch was taken up so that he should not see death; and he was not found
because God took him up.. . ..." Hebrews 11:5 (New Am. Standard Version). Nowadays of
course, "getting taken" means something entirely different. I
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accuracy of this particular conclusion would be to catalogue the mor-
tality of all men living and dead. An impossible feat to be sure. This
illustrates both the major weakness and major strength of reasoning by
induction. The weakness is that in most cases conclusions reached by
induction are non-verifiable. (This flaw, according to philosopher
David Hume, renders the entire method of reasoning suspect.) 59 On
the other hand, if we were to be limited in our knowledge and reason-
ing to only what we can actually experience we would know very little
about the universe in which we live. Induction allows us to make a




One of the most common-and useful-forms of induction is the
analogy. Analogy refers to the kind of reasoning based on the assump-
tion that if certain objects or phenomena are similar in some known
respects, they will probably be similar in other respects as well. 6' For
example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration conducts tests on
white laboratory mice to determine whether there is anything on earth
that is not carcinogenic. Why use white mice? Aside from the fact that
they are a lot cheaper than human subjects, the reason is that the folks
at the FDA rely on an analogy between the physiology of mice and
men. They reason that if the chemistry and reactions of the mice are
very similar to that of human subjects in a number of known areas,
then the reactions of mice will be predictive of human reactions in cur-
rently unknown areas. The same reasoning process is at the bottom of
psychological experiments with pigeons and rhesus monkeys.62
Consider another example. Mortimer Kofax has purchased most of
his household needs at Ripco, a local discount department store. He
has been very pleased with the quality of his purchases over the years,
particularly the shoes, the clothing, and the household appliances. Last
month Ripco announced the opening of a new department, to wit, a
grocery store. Mortimer proclaims that he will buy his groceries at
Ripco as well. In doing so, Mortimer reasons by analogy, unless of
59. D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE BOOK I, Part IV, Sec. 1 (1935).
60. For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of induction see KAHANE, supra note 38,
at 296-300.
61. For more detailed discussions of analogical reasoning see Copi, supra note 38, at 351-68;
KAHANE, supra note 38, at 255-57; and SCRIVEN, supra note 45, at 211.
62. See P. BROADHURST, THE SCIENCE OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 9-22 (1963); M. DENNY & S.
RATNER, COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH IN ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 1-20 (rev. ed. 1970);
and N. MACKINTOSH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ANIMAL LEARNING 1-7 (1974).
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course he happens to be a major shareholder in Ripco, Inc. He decides
that since Ripco produces high quality shoes, clothing and appliances,
the company probably sells high quality food as well.63 The analogy
could be schematically represented as follows:
A (shoes), B (clothes), and C (appliances) have the properties X
(Ripco-produced) and Y (high quality).
D (food) has the property of X (Ripco-produced).
Therefore D (food) probably has the property of Y (high quality).
Note that these analogies can never be conclusively proven. There is
no deduction per se involved here. We can only speak of conclusions
that are more or less likely, or "probable" as logicians like to say. How
do we know when an analogy produces a likely or probable conclu-
sion? There is no hard and fast rule. But there are a number of helpful
"criteria" by which analogies and analogical arguments can be evalu-
ated.' One, for example, is the number of confirming instances. As-
sume I am interested in purchasing a dog but am not interested in
purchasing a cocker spaniel because I think they are ill tempered. If I
base my conclusion on the fact that I know of two other cocker spaniels
that are ill tempered then I am-arguing by analogy.65 The analogy is
A and B (the two dogs) have the properties
X (spaniels) and Y (ill tempered).
C (another dog) has the property X (spaniel).
Therefore C (the other dog) is probably Y (ill tempered).
This is a fairly weak analogy on its face. If I refuse to purchase a
spaniel because I know of only two others that were ill tempered.I am.
probably wrong. My sample is too small to make any really forceful
analogy. Now if I recently read an article in Veterinarian's Monthly
that reported that out of 903 spaniels, 903 were ill tempered, then I
would be in a much better position to argue by the analogy.
A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I... etc. have the properties X and Y.
Q has the property X.
Therefore Q probably has the property Y.
This is a much more solid argument. It is still not conclusive. There
could always be 903 spaniels locked up in some unknown kennel that
are perfectly good natured. But as far as analogies go this would be
quite forceful. The greater the number of analogous instances, the bet-
ter the argument.
Another criterion of a "good" analogy is the number of respects in
63. The example is based on one provided by CoPi, supra note 38, at 352.
64. The only texts that describe the makings of a good analogy appear to be BRENNAN, supra
note 38, at 158-67; and Copi, supra note 38, at 358-68.
65. The example is a slight modification of one provided by Copi, supra note 38, at 358, who
objected to chow dogs instead of cocker spaniels.
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which the entities are said to be analogous." If Eliza Periwinkle
purchases her shoes exclusively at Ripco simply because Ripco's shoes
have always given good wear we have the following analogy:
A (shoes) has the properties X (Ripco-produced) and Y (quality).
B (more shoes) have the property of X.
Therefore B probably has the property Y.
This is another weak analogy. It could be strengthened considerably if
Ms. Periwinkle discovered that not only were the shoes sold by the
same store, but also that they were manufactured by the same com-
pany, from the same materials, and that they are intended for the same
use."7 Now we have a different argument:
A has the properties U,V,W,X and Y.
B has the properties U,V,W and X.
Therefore B probably has the property Y too.
The third criterion of acceptable analogies is the number of disanalo-
gies that can be constructed, particularly relevant ones.68 A "dis-
analogy" is any characteristic held by any of the supposedly analogous
entities that is not held by all of them. The more differences you can
discover the less appealing the analogy. Assume that you are a book
publisher. Tanya Telltale is one of your clients. She has published
seven detective novels that were million sellers. Now she is pressing
you for an increase in her percentage of the profits, since she has just
completed her eighth book. She argues that she is a "proven commod-
ity." Her past books sold, so her future one will, too. On its face this
argument does not seem too objectionable. But what if you find out
that Tanya's new book is not a detective story but a romantic comedy,
that her last seven books were co-authored by Skip MacDonald, who
recently passed away, and that this eighth novel is Tanya's first solo
effort? The argument crumbles with each dissimilarity between the
new book and the previous seven. In the same way, any analogy will
crumble under the weight of piling disanalogies.
A final characteristic of convincing analogies is the relevance of the
analogy.69 Imagine this example. Ira Bimbaum owns a 1952 Cadillac.
It is blue, with a grey landau-type top, tinted windshields, bench seats,
wonderbar radio control, and a Rolls Royce hood ornament. It runs
like the proverbial top. Ira decides to buy his wife a car. Based on his
experience with the fine running Cadillac he purchases another Cadil-
lac. This one was also built in 1952, blue, with a grey landau-type top,
66. Copi, supra note 38, at 358.
67. Again, I have borrowed from Copi, supra note 38, at 358.
68. Copi, supra note 38 at 359; SCRiVEN, supra note 45, at 212.
69. Copi, supra note 38, at 360-61.
1981 / Logicfor Lawyers
tinted windshields, bench seats, wonderbar radio control, and a rolls
royce hood ornament. What's wrong with Ira's analogy? The analogy
is almost totally irrelevant. The characteristics compared have nothing
whatsoever to do with how a car, any car, runs. The analogy must be
relevant to the point of the argument being made.70
b. App lication." Understanding Legal Analogies
The process of analogization is at the root of almost all legal problem
solving, at least in English and American legal systems.7 One of the
strongest forces in legal reasoning is the idea of "precedent," that in
order to preserve continuity and consistency, problems should be
solved today as they have been solved in the past. Past decisions, there-
fore, become "authority" for current cases. Not all cases decided in the
past will, however, "bind" a court considering an immediate case.
Only the principles used in similar cases are important. Only analo-
gous cases are used.
The reasoning proceeds in quite orderly fashion in three basic
steps.7" First, search for a series of cases the facts and issues of which
are comparable to the facts and issues of the problem at hand.7 3 Sec-
ond, extract from the previously decided similar cases principles upon
which they are decided. And third, apply that principle to the problem
at hand. Schematically represented, the analogy looks familiar.
A & B (prior cases) have the properties X (facts and issues) and Y
(principle applied).
70. A difficult but important question is what is "relevance?" I will not pretend to answer.
See James, Relevancy, Probability, andthe Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941); Trautman, Logical
or LegalRelevancy--a Conflict in Theory. 5 VAND. L. REV. 385 (1952). Legal relevancy is slightly
different from logical relevancy. Still, these articles raise and discuss the common, basic issues.
71. In continental European systems, where the civil law emphasis on codes prevails, the idea
of precedent has a diminished role in legal decision-making. France, in particular, gives ex-
tremely little weight to past decisions:
There is nothing to prevent reference in the opinion to earlier court decisions, and the
practice of citing precedents is in fact becoming more frequent. But reference to one or
more prior cases does not constitute a self-sufficient legal argument and is not a valid
basis or decision. The Court of Cassation refrains rigorously from citation to earlier
decisions it has made or the existence of an established line of precedents. Judges fear
that this might give the impression that they consider themselves bound by doctrines in
their decisions.
R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW 181 (1972). See also R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS
IN THE WORLD TODAY 106 (1968).
72. See BERMAN & GREINER, supra note 4, at 416; and E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LE-
GAL REASONING 1 (1949) [hereinafter cited as LEVI]: "The basic pattern of legal reasoning is
reasoning by example." Levi, however, operating on the basis of an incorrect concept of induc-
tion, does not believe that reasoning by example constitutes inductive logic.
73. I say "series" of cases for two reasons. First, rarely is a single case dispositive of an issue.
It would be unrealistic to teach legal reasoning as if a single case would be controlling. But see
generally STATSKY & WERNET, supra, which avoids entirely the process of synthesizing cases.
Second, in a theoretical sense, it does not seem possible or desirable to decipher a single case in
vacuo. As Llewellyn said so emphatically, "No case can have meaning by itselfl" K. LLEWELLYN,
THE BRAMBLE BUSH 48 (1960).
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C (instant case) has the properties X.
Therefore C should also have the property Y.
The reasoning pattern is very similar to the more ordinary examples
discussed above. Because two objects (cases) share some properties, it
is argued that they should also share others. Cases with the same facts
should apply the same rules of law. Consider the following example.
Suppose I am faced with a case involving an individual's right of free
speech. My client is a member of the Ku Klux Klan and has just been
interviewed on local television advocating that Jews and Blacks should
be expelled from the country or deprived of their civil rights. 4 For
saying these things my client has been arrested for violating a local
statute proscribing the "advocacy of terrorism." My client feels that
even if the statute was violated he is protected by his constitutional
right of free speech.
The answer to this question will lie in the manner in which courts
have treated similar problems in the past. My research reveals three
cases that are more or less "on point." One involves a communist
speaking out for world revolution, another involves a socialist printing
pamphlets urging laborers to strike and join the socialist cause, and the
third involves a socialist advocating resistance to the draft during the
first world war."
I compare the facts of these cases with the facts of my own and I note
a number of important similarities. "Speech" is involved in all cases.
Whether in the form of vocalization or printed word, I have communi-
cation and this, I feel, is the relevant factor. In all cases I have at issue
the constitutionality of the application of a statute proscribing advo-
cacy of revolution or obstruction of normal government activities. In
all cases I am faced with the speeches of representatives of "subversive"
or unpopular political groups. And in all cases the speakers are advo-
cating actions that are allegedly illegal. These similarities in facts con-
vince me that an analogy can effectively be drawn between the prior
cases and the problem at hand. As a result I extract what I think is the
rule that the court used in deciding these cases-a process that is dis-
cussed later in this article-and apply the rule to my client's case.
The reasoning process is no different than any other analogy dis-
cussed so far. Reduced to a simple formula, the argument presents no
surprises.
A, B, and C (prior cases) have the properties X (facts) and Y (rule).
74. The facts are based on Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
75. These facts are roughly based on Dennis . United Staes, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). There are
certainly many more cases on point.
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D (instant case) has the properties X.
Therefore D should have the property Y.
Understanding the process of analogization can greatly enhance un-
derstanding of legal reasoning. It certainly seems less confusing and
less threatening when it is understood that at the root of legal reasoning
is a simple, logical process.76
Understanding the principles of drawing convincing analogies is
helpful for the same reason. It facilitates an understanding of why
judges, lawyers, and teachers insist on one analogy as opposed to
others. Indeed, knowledge of the few simple rules of constructing good
analogies is an exceptionally useful tool when arguing for a particular
analogy or attempting to criticize analogies drawn by others. Arguing
over competing analogies is, after all, the heart of nearly every legal
controversy." One lawyer argues that his cases are analogous. The
other lawyer contends that his cases are analogous. And the judge may
choose from among the competing analogies or select some of his own.
In any event, the weighing and selection of analogies is crucial to the
ultimate decision of the court.
How do you know which legal analogies will probably prevail? Re-
call the four simple criteria of good analogies. Each of them is ex-
tremely relevant to the legal reasoning process. Consider the first
criterion, the number of entities--cases in this instance-with the sali-
ent features of the analogy. This certainly applies to legal analogies as
well as to other sorts. The more cases illustrating the same salient fea-
tures the stronger the analogy. This is not to say that by citing numer-
ous cases in a brief an argument by analogy will be more convincing.
Indeed it is a veritable maxim of first year legal writing that a few good
analogies are the goal and that string citations are as loathesome as the
plague.78 The reasons for these rules, however, are practical and not
logical. Judges, senior partners, and teachers have a limited amount of
time so arguments, both oral and written, must be brief. A lawyer must
make his point in a minimum amount of time and space. It is far more
convincing and practical to explain in detail a few good analogies
rather than to list one hundred without accompanying analysis. Still, it
is a comforting thought to the researcher when he finds a large number
of cases in agreement, and conversely the researcher is likely to be on
76. Still there are some who maintain that analogization or at least legal analogization is not
logical. Levi, for example, is unique to legal reasoning. Berman & Greiner, too, feel that this
aspect of legal reasoning is not inductive, though for reasons less clear than Levi's. BERMAN &
GREINER, supra note 4, at 418.
77. See LEvI, supra note 72, at 5.
78. See, eg., E. RE, BRUEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT 150 (1974); and R. STERN & E.
GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 712 (5th ed. 1978).
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shakey ground if in all of legal history there is only a single case that is
analogous to a given problem.
The second criterion is particularly useful. Recall that it concerns
the number of respects in which the entities-again the cases-are said
to be analogous. Simply stated: the greater the similarity in facts the
more convincing the analogy. In fact, if you can find a case with ex-
actly the same facts you will have won the day. The analogy will be
considered to be "on all fours," and the court will be all but compelled
to reach the desired conclusion. 9 Unfortunately, cases "on all fours"
are one in a million. Most of the time legal reasoning involves dealing
with cases that are not identical dealing instead with ones that are simi-
lar in some respects and different in others. As a result, the goal of
legal research and reasoning is to find a case that is as close to the fact
of the problem at hand as possible.
The usefulness of the third criterion becomes relevant here, for the
greater the dissimilarities in the facts of the cases, the less convincing
the analogy. This is one of the keys to arguing a legal issue in court.
When an opponent argues that a judge should adopt one analogy you
should attempt to discredit that analogy by citing as many differences
between the cases mentioned as you can. Just as the number of similar-
ities strengthens an analogy, so also does the number of dissimilarities
weaken an analogy.
But it is not a matter of simple arithmetic. The judge will not simply
pull out his plastic statue of the blind lady of justice and weigh the
similarities and dissimilarities on the hallowed scale. Although quanti-
ty is important, quality is superior. The similarities or differences in
facts must be relevant to the issue of law being argued in order for the
analogy to be convincing. A hit-and-run case involving a Hel's Angel
member, riding a 90cc Yamaha dirt cycle, with knobby tires, competi-
tion stripes, and a hole in the muffler, going thirty-two miles per hour
in a hospital zone may have little relevance to a nuisance or civil distur-
bance case with precisely the same facts. The facts must be not only
similar. They must be relevant.
79. The "all but" is an important qualifier. In the first place if a court is faced with an "all
fours" case, that case can be overruled. Courts are in no absolute sense "bound" by prior deci-
sions. In the second place even cases that seem obviously to be on point sometimes get distin-
guished anyway. It is the well known phenomenon of the "brown cow case" (red cow in New
York). The case involved a farmer's cow that broke through a fence and marched over a neigh-
bors crop lands, eating all the way. The neighbor sued. The owner of the cow, however, cited a
case on all fours with the facts of the dispute, which provided an absolute defense. The judge
declined to adopt the rule of that case since the case involved a white cow and in the dispute at bar
the cow was brown.
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2. Causation and the Development of Theories
a. D1qfnition
Inductive reasoning is not limited in its application to the use of
analogies. It is also used quite frequently to determine the causes of a
series of events, and to develop theories or rules that help explain the
events and help predict them with greater accuracy. The English phi-
losopher John Stuart Mill is the best known proponent of this type of
inductive analysis.8 0 In fact his methods or canons of inductive infer-
ence are called "Mill's Methods" to this day.8 ' These canons are fairly
simple to understand and very easy to apply.
The first method Mill called the "method of agreement." It is best
explained in terms of an example.8 2 Suppose six law students who reg-
ularly eat at the school cafeteria suddenly suffer from violent nausea
and stomach cramps. Dr. Hammelberg is called in to investigate the
cause of the students' illness. She interviews the students in order to
identify some common antecedent conditions. The interviews reveal
that on the day of the illness the first student ate soup, salad, and a tuna
sandwich; the second student ate soup, salad, a tuna sandwich, and
some donuts; the third student ate a tuna sandwich and some donuts;
the fourth student ate a salad, a tuna sandwich, and some donuts; the
fifth student ate a tuna sandwich and a bowl of chili; the sixth student
ate soup, a tuna sandwich, and some donuts. Dr. Hammelberg noted
all of this information in graphic form for clarity:
Food Soup Salad Tuna Chili Donuts
Student
1 X X X
2 X X X X
3 X X
4 X X X
5 X X
6 X X X
From this illustration it is clear that the element common to all of the
sick students was eating a tuna sandwich. Having located this common
element Dr. Hammelberg concludes that there is probably something
wrong with the latest batch of tuna fish sandwiches. This is the method
80. See note 21 supra.
81. Mill's methods of inductive inference can be found at MILL, supra note 21, at 222-47.
They are also described in BRENNAN, supra note 38, at 167-76; Coni, supra note 38, at 369-421;
and KAHANE, supra note 38, at 261-65.
82. The example is a very common one in logic books. Mine is an adaptation of one pro-
vided by Copi, supra note 38, at 376-78.
Pacfic Law Journal / Vol. 13
of agreement at work. Whenever we can identify the antecedents-
particularly single antecedents--common to all instances of a given
phenomenon we can suggest that we have discovered its cause.
This method is of course subject to some severe limitations. In the
first place it can never prove conclusively that the common antecedent
is the cause. This is induction, not deduction, and we can only suggest
probable causes, not conclusive ones. Moreover, the method functions
best when there is but a single antecedent. Rarely do we encounter
several instances of a given phenomenon that have only one antecedent
in common. It is more likely that several antecedents will be common
to all of the instances. And determining which antecedent is the cause
can be difficult. Finally, properly classifying the antecedents can be a
challenging task. Consider the example of two famous scientists, Ches-
terton and Belloc, who attempted to find the cause of intoxication. 3
They drank brandy and water and got drunk. They drank whiskey and
water and got drunk. They drank vodka and water and got drunk.
They drank gin and water and got drunk. Over a stiff cup of coffee
they plotted the antecedents of their insobriety and found only water
common to each binge. They scientifically concluded that water was
the cause of drunkenness and solemnly took oaths to never imbibe the
substance again.
The limitations of the method of agreement are militated somewhat
by the use (often the concurrent use) of a second method, the method of
difference. This method is particularly useful when there are several
common antecedents. The method of difference can be simply stated as
follows. Identify the antecedents of both the occurrence of a given phe-
nomenon and the nonoccurrence of the same phenomenon. If every
antecedent but one is common, then the uncommon antecedent is prob-
ably the cause.
An example will clarify. Suppose famous attorney Justin Case suf-
fers from occasional fatigue, exhaustion, and a terrible case of indiges-
tion. 4 Case has little faith in psychiatrists, and so he conducts an
experiment on his own. He begins to chart his regular activities to see
if he could use some of Mill's methods to identify his problem. He
charts a week of activity, noting the instances of his following a bland
diet, engaging in fifteen minutes of exercise, going to trial, watching
television, and smoking his pipe.
83. This well known example is recounted in BRENNAN, supra note 38, at 169-70.
84. The example is adapted from BRENNAN, supra note 38, at 171.
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Bland
Activity Foods Exercise Trial T.V. Pipe Illness?
Day
Mon X X X X No
Tu X X X X X Yes
Wed X X X X X Yes
Th X X X X No
Fri X X X X X Yes
Sat X X X X No
Sun X X X No
When Case compares the instances of his illness with the absence of
illness he finds that all but one antecedent were in common: the pipe
smoking. When Case smoked his pipe he became ill. When he did not
smoke his pipe, he avoided the illness. Reasoning by the method of
difference, Case decides that smoking pipes was probably the cause of
his ill condition, and he promptly switches to smoking cigars.
This is an admittedly simple example but it makes the point. And
even simple as it is, the method "can lead to remarkable discoveries. It
was primarily the application of this method, for example, that led to
the discovery of the cause of yellow fever. During the Spanish-Ameri-
can war an army doctor compared the incidence of yellow fever with
the conditions in the hospital, including sleeping areas, cleanliness of
environment, contact with other patients, and so forth. The observant
army doctor noticed that the single difference in conditions when the
incidence of fever was high was absence of mosquito screens.
8 5
There are weaknesses with this method too, of course. Again the
method is inductive and never conclusively proves causation. And like
the method of agreement, this method is most convincing when only a
single difference in antecedents exists. The combination of the methods
of agreement and difference is, however, an effective way of minimiz-
mng some of these limitations.
A third method of inductive inference is called the method of con-
comitant variation. It is slightly different from the two discussed thus
far. According to this method of inductive inference when one of the
antecedents varies and the occurrence of a given phenomenon also var-
ies then there is probably a causal connection between them. If, for
example, there is an increase in cigarette smoking followed by a similar
increase in lung cancer, it is probable that cigarette smoking is a cause,
if not the cause, of lung cancer. This is the very common reasoning
85. Brennan, supra note 38, at 170-71.
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process also known as "correlation." It must not be forgotten, though,
that correlation does not conclusively prove causation. Simply because
the price of cocaine varies directly with the salaries of law school deans
does not mean that there is some causal relationship.
Although none of Mill's methods will provide an indicator of causa-
tion with slide rule efficiency, their usefulness should not be underesti-
mated. In the first place, they may be combined in many instances to at
least partially mitigate the uncertainty that shrouds all inductive rea-
soning. In the second place, despite the fact that the methods cannot be
used with deductive precision, they are excellent tools for creating hy-
potheses that can be verified by observation or other types of research.
Some of the most important discoveries in the history of science were
based on theories suggested by some or all of Mill's methods of induc-
tive inference.
b. Application: The extraction of rules of law
Even legal problem solving can be facilitated by the use of Mill's
methods, as long as it is kept in mind that these methods of inference
are not conclusive, but rather suggestive and probabalistic. Recall the
three-step process that is often used to describe legal reasoning. First
you look for analogous cases, then you extract the rule of those cases,
and finally you apply the rule to the facts of the case at hand. In previ-
ous sections the process of selecting the analogous cases has been de-
scribed. Now it is time to investigate the process of "extracting the rule
of law." This process, "case synthesis" is probably the most difficult
facet of legal reasoning for law students, and even lawyers, to under-
stand. It need not be so threatening.
Once we have selected the analogous cases we are faced with a situa-
tion that is very similar to the example described in the analysis of
Mill's methods. We are faced with a series of given phenomena, the
results of the cases, and we are faced with a host of antecedents, the
facts and dispositions of the cases. If we can identify some sort of pat-
tern in the facts and the reasonings of the courts, we can suggest a rule
that explains the results of those cases in a consistent fashion and that
will serve as a likely predictor of how a judge will, or should, rule in the
case at hand. Note that both facts and reasonings of judges are consid-
ered in defining the antecedents. A simple comparison of the rules of
all of the cases will not explain much at all. The facts will flesh out
those rules, giving them meaning and context. If the courts all seem to
think that the element of "advocacy" is important in determining the
nature of first amendment rights, it is important to know exactly what
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advocacy means. The best indicators of the meaning of rules are the
ways in which the rules are applied to the facts of actual cases.
How exactly are Mill's methods applied to this aspect of legal rea-
soning? Essentially in the same ways that we could discover probable
causes of the food poisoning of the six law students described earlier.
A very graphic approach, in fact, can be helpful. Simply plot the cases
and their results against the categories of facts involved in each of the
cases.
Facts 1 2 3 4 5 6 Result
Cases
Av.B X X X P
Cv.
D X X X P
Ev.F X X P
Gv.H X X X Q
Thus, in the illustration above the use of the methods of difference and
agreement would seem to suggest that in the four cases analyzed the
general rule is that facts represented by the category 4 lead to legal
consequence P. Only those facts were in common with the result P, and
the absence of those facts is accompanied by a different result.
This all seems very simplistic and mechanical at first blush, hardly
suited to the complexities and subtleties of the law. And this is partly
true. If this type of analysis is the sole basis for the conclusion that "the
rule of law is (fill in the blank)," then whoever says so is on shakey
ground indeed. There are many other considerations-equity, social
policy, prevailing philosophy, economics, and others, to name only a
few-that enter into the decision of what rule to follow. But at least the
application of these simple principles can steer us on to the right path.
These charts and principles are only tools and nothing more. Still they
are useful tools.
Recall the example involving the Ku Klux Klan client. My research
indicated that there were three cases on point. Assuming that they are
analogous, what rule of law can be inferred from these cases? The an-
swer here always involves comparing and contrasting the facts. Mill's
methods makes the process a little easier. If I plot my facts on an in-
ductive type chart, I am given considerable help in coming up with a
rule of law.
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Case #1 x x x x x x No free speech defense
Case #2 x x x x x No free speech defense
Case #3 x x x x Successful free speech defense
From this simplified example we can-applying the methods of agree-
ment and difference-infer that when we have a socialist who advo-
cates imminent lawless action and there is a likelihood that that
advocacy will incite the imminent lawless action, then there is no first
amendment defense to the application of a statute prohibiting certain
kinds of speech. The elements of socialism, advocacy of imminent law-
less action, and the likelihood of incitement were the three antecedents
to the "no defense" result. Similarly, the absence of those elements
accompanied a different result. Is this then the rule? Certainly not.
Much more investigation is needed. Remember that induction leads
only to probable conclusions. Remember also that Mill's methods
work best when only single common antecedents are identified. If we
have identified more than one it does not necessarily follow that all of
the fact categories are crucial to the result. What, for example, is the
importance of the fact that in all of the "no defense" cases above, the
defendants were socialists? Probably not much when you consider that
in the third case the communist was treated differently and when you
begin to look deeper into the social and ethical implications of the new
rule.
There is an additional weakness in using this kind of charting as if it
lead to necessary conclusions. The patterns that are formed will de-
pend on how the categories are defined. Someone else could categorize
the facts of the three free speech cases and come to a totally different
conclusion. Indeed, in a legal proceeding, that is exactly what will hap-
pen. My opponent will look at the very same cases and attempt to con-
vince the court that they stand for a different rule or principle, and the
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court may adopt my analysis, or my opponent's, or create one of its
own.8 6 It is the same problem as the one encountered by Chesterton
and Belloc, our friends who decided that water was the cause of inebri-
ation. This, however, should not be taken as a reason to avoid the ap-
plication of methods of inductive inference. For the opponents reach
their contrary conclusions by the very same methods. The categoriza-
tion of facts is a complex and creative aspect of legal reasoning. But
once the facts are categorized, the application of Mill's methods can
make more plain what is otherwise a hapless assortment of facts.8 7 In-
duction is a tool that carries with it some limitations. But within those
limitations it can be extremely useful in solving legal problems.
C. Common Fallacies
Since the time of Aristotle, nearly every textbook on logic has in-
cluded a list of common fallacies of reasoning.88 Most of them do not
concern deductive reasoning, the analysis of the form of certain argu-
ments, hence they are often labled "informal fallacies." These common
fallacies consist of a large list (over 120 by one count) of mistakes in
everyday arguments.89 They are easy to understand, and they are ex-
emplified by abundant, often humorous examples. They are also prob-
ably the most useful of logical principles both in ordinary rhetoric and
in legal arguments. There is neither time nor reason to analyze each of
these fallacies. A few should suffice in showing the utility and the
value of knowing some common reasoning traps.
1. Ad Hominem
Whenever someone attacks not an opponent's argument, but the op-
ponent himself, the fallacy of adhominem-to the person-is commit-
ted.90 It is a fallacy to do so because rarely does a person's morality,
political leanings, looks, religion, or membership in the American Civil
Liberties Union have anything to do with the merits of the argument
being posited. When Senator Jennings Randolph dismissed supporters
86. See LLEWELLYN, supra, at 48-52 for a nice description of this point.
87. If nothing else, Mill's methods provide useful organizational tools. For an excellent ex-
ample of Millsian charting applied to a Supreme Court case see Justice Frankfurter's opinion
(with several charts) in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 551 (1960). Frankfurter charted 49
Sunday laws and the facts covered by the laws to illustrate their common purposes.
88. See SophisticalRefutations, THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (W. Ross ed. 1928) for the origi-
nal thirteen fallacies. All of the sources cited at note 38, supra, include chapters on logical falla-
cies. There are also some excellent books devoted exclusively to fallacies. Among them are: T.
DAMER, ATTACKING FAULTY REASONING (1980); W. FEARNSIDE & W. HOLTHER, FALLACY:
THE COUNTERFEIT OF ARGUMENT, and CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC, supra note 39.
89. D. FISHER, HISTORIAN'S FALLACIES (1970) lists 112 fallacies and discusses even more in
the text of the book.
90. Actually adhominem means "to the man" but that would be sexist.
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of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment by calling them a "small
band of bra-less bubble heads," he provided a sterling example of this
reasoning error.91
The ad hominem fallacy is particularly at home in the legal profes-
sion. Countless times sly trial lawyers have jumped at the chance to
discredit witnesses by slipping in the fact that the witnesses are closet
communists,92 homosexuals,93 or prior felons.94 The famous case of
Sacco and Vanzetti provides an excellent illustration.95 These two Ital-
ian-Americans were arrested for murder during the height of the "Red
scare" in this country in the 1920s. Much of the trial focused not on the
guilt of the two men, but rather on their radical politics. They were
ultimately found guilty and executed. Consider an example closer to
home. Many states in this country still have evidence laws that permit
a victim's prior sexual history to be admitted in a rape prosecution.
The past behavior of a woman, sexual or not, would seem to be of little
if any relevance to the establishment of the facts of a particular case of
sexual assault.96 In a lighter vein, consider the example of the refusal
of Texas lawyers to cite any cases written by a group of reviled
judges.97
The fallacy even crops up in the nation's highest court. In the case of
91. After describing the great advances women have made in the last century, Senator Ran-
dolph comments:
Today, I fear, this progress is being retarded by a strange and strident voice that pro-
fesses to speak of all women-everywhere. It parades under a banner of odd acronyms
claiming "oppression," and screams for an ill-defined liberation .... The small band
of bra-less bubble heads who consider free and unlimited abortions an absolute "right"
are not a valid voice for the American woman anymore than the fashion designers or
makers of slimmer cigarettes and more kissable lipsticks. Passage of the so-called equal
sexual rights amendment is morally laudable, but it could create a jungle of jurispru-
dence that might result in such inanities as maternity leave for male employees ....
116 CONG. REC. 30,099 (1970). The senator's speech provides a minor goldmine of logical falla-
cies, among them distortion (does any feminist group profess to be the exclusive voice for all
women?), and the slippery slope (a 'jungle of jurisprudence?"). See notes 103-107, 114-122 and
accompanying text infra.
92. It is still a general rule of evidence that, for the purpose of attacking credibility, a witness
may be asked on cross examination whether he is a member of the Communist Party. NLRB v.
Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 180 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1950); see 98 C.J.S. Witnesses §515(i) (1957).
93. Although the general rule is that evidence of "illicit relations" is not admissible, except
for the purposes of proving bias, the number of appellate cases on the subject seems to indicate
that attorneys are still diligently trying to slip such information into trial proceedings. See Annot.,
25 A.L.R.3d 537 (1969).
94. This is a thorny issue of evidence. For a discussion of the several approaches see C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 85-90 (2d ed. 1972).
95. See generally F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCHO AND VANZETT: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS AND LAYMEN (1927).
96. There are a host of cases and law review articles on this subject. See, e.g., Ordover,
Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Characterfor Chas-
tity, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 90 (1977); Comment, Due Process Challenge to Restorations on the Sub-
stantive Use of a Rape Prosecutrix's Prior Sexual Conduct, 9 U.C.D. L. REV. 443 (1976).
97. The judges--those serving during the reconstruction period that followed the Civil
War-were considered uniformly incompetent. See JUSTIFICATION OF THE LAW, supra note 53, at
80-81.
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Papish v. University of Wisconsin9 8 the Supreme Court decided that a
student passing out allegedly indecent newspapers was protected by the
first amendment. Justice Rehnquist dissented in this 1972 case, includ-
ing in his opinion disparaging remarks concerning the defendant's aca-
demic standing and evident lack of academic motivation.99 It is not
clear why this is at all relevant to the merits of the case. It is clear that
the ad hominem is alive and well in the courtroom.
This is not to say that all attacks on persons instead of arguments are
fallacious. In a case involving abortion it may be quite relevant to
know that a witness is a Catholic Cardinal. The element of bias is an
important factor in assessing the credibility of a witness's testimony.100
Likewise it is relevant to assert that a witness has been convicted of
eighty-seven counts of perjuf.101 And there are certain cases when the
character of a witness or defendant is the very fact that may determine
rights and liabilities.'02
The point remains, though, that it is advisable to be wary of argu-
ments that attack persons rather than other arguments. Double check
the relevance of such comments before advancing them too hastily.
2. The Slippery Slope
This is an amusing but dangerous fallacy. It is committed whenever
someone says if we take one stand, then another one certainly follows,
and another one, and so on until we reach a result that every sane per-
son would easily recognize as ludicrous or undesirable.0 3 It is the bu-
reaucrats' favorite remark: "You may have a good case. But if we let
you have your way, we'll have to let everyone do likewise and that just
wouldn't do. . . ." It is the tried and true justification for wars of all
shapes and sizes: "If we weren't [in Vietnam] those Commies would
have the whole thing, and it wouldn't be long until we'd be looking off
the coast of Santa Monica."" It is also the lame excuse for a justifica-
tion of a judicial decision in innumerable legal opinions. It is the dom-
98. 410 U.S. 667 (1972).
99. Id. at 673-75.
100. See generally MCCORMICK, supra, at 78-80.
101. See id. at 86.
102. For example, a case of defamation, see id. at 443-44.
103. This is often mistakenly labled "reductio adabsurdum," which is actually an acceptable
method of indirectly proving the invalidity of a deduction. Generally speaking the rule of reductio
ad absurdum is whatever leads to a contradiction is false. See BRENNAN, supra note 38, at 127,
130; COHEN & NAGEI, supra at 88-91; and KAHANE, supra note 38, at 67-70.
104. Bob Hope, quoted in CONTEMPORARY RiiETotIc, supra note 39, at 44. Similar com-
ments have cropped up recently in the Reagan administration as attempted justifications for
United States aid to the nation of El Salvador. We are not just protecting a tiny Central American
country, the argument goes, ultimately the security of our own borders is at stake. See Salvador'r
4rms Pipeline, TIME, March 2, 1981, at 41.
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ino theory of litigation: "If we hold for the plaintiff a flood of litigation
will follow . ,,*"105 In the first place, it is not always so clear that a
flood of litigation will in fact follow. In the second place, so what? It
would be a sad day for our legal system when the equitable and other-
wise legal solution to problems gives way to predictions of administra-
tive inconvenience.
A marvelous old example of the fallacy of the slippery slope is the
English case of Priestly v. Fowler.106 The defendant in this case was
injured while driving an allegedly defective wagon in the service of his
master. The defendant attempted to convince the court that masters
have a duty to keep such equipment in proper repair, and that duty
being violated, they are liable to injured servants. The court com-
mented that such a rule would be untenable because of its natural con-
sequences:
If the owner of the carriage is therefore responsible for the suffi-
ciency of his carriage to his servant, he is responsible for the negli-
gence of his coach-maker, or his harness-maker, or his coachman.
The footman, therefore, who rides behind the carriage may have an
action against his master for a defect in the carriage owing to the
negligence of the coachmaker, or for a defect in the harness arising
from the negligence of the harness-maker, or for drunkenness, ne-
glect, or want of skill in the coachman; nor is there any reason why
the principle should not, if applicable in this class of cases, extend to
many others. The master, for example, would be liable to the servant
for the negligence of the chambermaid, for putting him into a damp
bed; for that of the upholsterer, for sending in a crazy bedstead,
whereby he was made to fall down while asleep and injure himself;
for the negligence of the cook, in not properly cleaning the copper
vessels used in the kitchen; of the butcher, in supplying the family
with meat of a quality injurious to the health; of the builder, for a
defect in the foundation of the house, whereby it fell, and injured
both the master and the servant by the ruins.
10 7
This, said the court, is both inconvenient and absurd. So, it would
seem, is the court's reasoning.
105. See, eg., Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448,
493 (1957):
'By offering easy access to the courts in cases where a breach of a collective-bargaining
agreement is alleged, it would act as an inducement to litigate every alleged grievance,
and would result in a flood of litigation making the courts again [a] battlefield. .. .'
See also U.S. v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); Calif. Dental Ass'n v.
American Dental Ass'n., 23 Cal. 3d 346 (1979); Dinkins v. U.S., 374 A.2d 292 (D.C. 1977); Schenk
v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199 (1968).
106. 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837).
107. Id. at 1031-32.
1981 / Logic for Lawyers
3. Suppressed Evidence
This is not exactly a fallacy of logic. Still it is an extremely common
error in argument. The fallacy of suppressed evidence occurs whenever
an argument is stated and relevant damaging information is either in-
tentionally or negligently omitted. Think of all of the automobile com-
mercials on television touting a particular model as "the number one
selling car in America." How can all those cars be number one at the
same time? It's easy once you know the information that is conve-
niently left out of the commercial: that, for example, the XG-7 is the
hottest selling car in the mid-price-subcompact-domestic-body-foreign
engine-category. Movie ads are another fine example. Often an ad for
a movie will contain such recommendations as "exhilirating and fan-
tastic . . ." to give the impression that a reviewer actually liked the
film. Frequently a closer look at the original reviewer's remarks will
reveal something like: "The director attempts to create exhilirating and
fantastic special effects, but unfortunately he fails miserably ... ."108
Consider also the comments of a nutritionist who defends the value of
dry breakfast cereals. "Cereals with milk," says the expert, "provide
approximately the same amount of protein and calories as a bacon and
eggs breakfast. And they also provide substantially more calcium, ri-
boflavin, niacin, thiamin, iron, and substantially less fat . ...
What the expert fails to say is that much if not most of the nutritive
value in the cereal breakfast comes from the milk, and in addition there
is no mention of the fact that many of the breakfast cereals contain
large amounts of sugar.l"0
It comes as no great surprise that this type of reasoning flaw crops up
frequently in legal writing. It is, however, a dangerous and embaras-
sing mistake. The most common example of this error in the legal con-
text is conveniently forgetting to mention a case that is on point but
that reaches an undesirable conclusion. It is to be sure not so common
for lawyers to indulge in this fallacy, for lawyers realize that if they do
not cite all of the cases on point, their opponents surely will."1 ' But law
students do not seem to learn this lesson easily, and the fallacy occurs
108. For example, recent ads for the new movie Superman II appeared with the comments of
one reviewer:. "It is that rarity of rarities, a sequel that readily surpasses the original." What the
ads fail to include is the next sentence, which continues: "This is not, perhaps, a task requiring
Kryptonic levels of wit and wisdom, because the initial effort was more than a little crude." Flying
High, TIME, June 8, 1981, at 74.
109. Nutrition expert Frederick Stare, quoted in CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC, supra note 39, at
91.
110. See CONSUMER REP., February 1981, at 68.
111. Even more important, it is the lawyer's ethical responsibility to cite all relevant case law.
The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility states clearly:
Where a lawyer knows of legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction directly adverse
to the position of his client, he should inform the tribunal of its existence unless his
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with alarming frequency in student, particularly first-year student, legal
writing.
4. Ad Mfisericordiam
Ad misericordiam is the logician's latin expression for an appeal to
pity. It is the first cousin of the adhominem, an appeal to the character
of the arguer rather than the argument itself. The appeal to pity occurs
whenever someone asserts a point of view not on the basis of the merits
of that point of view but on the basis of some irrelevant fact that might
appeal to the sympathies of the audience.
The appeal to pity is one of the trial lawyer's favorite tactics. Clar-
ence Darrow, for example, used it in the trial of Thomas Kidd, who
was accused of criminal conspiracy:
I appeal to you not for Thomas Kidd, but I appeal to you for the long
line-the long, long line reaching back through the ages and forward
to the years to come-the long line of despoiled and downtrodden
people of the earth. I appeal to you for those men who rise in the
morning before daylight comes and who go home at night when the
light has faded from the sky and give their life, their strength, their
toil to make others rich and great. I appeal to you in the name of
those women who are offering up their lives to this modem god of
gold, and I appeal to you in the name of those little children, the
living and the unborn.
112
What do the famous lawyer's comments have to do with the guilt or
innocence of the defendant? Of what relevance is the plight of the "de-
spoiled and downtrodden people" in this case?
Appeals to pity, like arguments ad hominem, are not always falla-
cious. There may be cases involving social or moral questions when
such considerations are quite relevant. Too, in the courtroom, the ap-
peal to pity is an extremely effective tool of persuasion, especially in
arguments before a jury. When "doing your best" for a client it might
seem difficult to throw out a tactic that works simply because it violates
adversary has done so; but having made such disclosure, he may challenge its soundness
in whole or in part.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ETHICAL CON-
SIDERATION 7-23 (1976).
112. ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED: CLARENCE DARROW IN His OWN WORDS 325 (A. Wein-
berg ed. 1957). Darrow's closing statement to the jury in this case is a masterful example of
distortion and irrelevancy. "It is impossible," said Darrow
to present this case to you without a broad survey of the great questions that are agitating
the world today. For whatever its form, this is really not a criminal case. It is but an
episode in the great battle for human liberty, a battle which was commenced when the
tyranny and oppression of man first caused him to impose upon his fellows, and which
will not end so long as the children of one father shall be compelled to toil to support the
children of another in luxury and ease.
Id. at 269.
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a rule in a dusty logic book. 13 But at the very least it is important to
know that the fallacy exists, to clarify arguments being advanced as
well as critiquing and attacking arguments in opposition.
5. Distortion
A frequent method of argument involves distorting an opponent's
position and attacking the distortion to prove an opposite point. Dis-
tortions are always easier to attack than the opponent's real arguments.
Distortion is a subtle art that can be practiced in several different ways.
An argument can be extended beyond its original bounds allowing in-
ferences to be drawn that are totally unwarranted. An argument can
simply be misstated, though this is a risky tactic. An argument can also
be carefully simplified in such a way as to make it look absurd.
Distortion is a favorite of politicians, particularly during campaign
seasons. Former Vice-President Spiro Agnew was an expert at distor-
tion. Consider his remarks made during a 1970 congressional cam-
paign trip:
The issue [in the November elections] is whether a free people
operating under a free and representative system of government will
continue to govern the United States, or whether they will cede that
power to some of the people-the irresponsible people, the lawbreak-
ers on the streets and campuses and their followers, their sycophants
and the people who subscribe to their activities behind the scenes, the
radical liberals.14
Was that really the issue? Was the Democratic party really advocating
power to the "radicals"?
In a similar vein President Ronald Reagan ran on a platform that
was riddled with distortions, among them that the Democratic party,
113. If the appeal to pity is too obvious or too inflammatory, though, an attorney runs the risk
of having the tactic backfire. "Not only," says one commentator, "do they [appeals to pity] in-
volve serious risk of reversal of a favorable judgment because of an improper argument, but also
there is some risk that the jury will consider the argument a plea for a gift rather than a plea for
justice." R. KEETON, TRIAL TAcTICS AND METHODS 276 (1973). See also Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d
1249 (1968).
Still every standard trial advocacy textbook contains advice on how to appeal to the sympathies
of the jury. Consider the advice of one in the case of a personal injury suit
Tell them about the injury, how it occurred and what has happened to him [plaintiff]
since the injury. Use descriptive terms. . . if bones are fractured, tell the jury about the
bone and its fracture. If the femur is involved, tell the jury about it, that it is the longest
bone in the body. That it is a weight bearing bone, that it is important to walking, lifting,
running, squatting, and so forth. Describe the healing process, the reason for the pain.
Describe the soft tissues in the areas of the fracture, the tendons, muscles, blood supply,
and nerves. If rib fractures are present, describe the function of the ribs, the expansion
and contraction while breathing, why it hurts when the client breathes. Add up the
number of breaths taken during the day and tell the jury.
A. CONE & V. LAWYER, THE ART OF PERSUASION IN LITIGATION 272-73 (1966).
114. Quoted in CONTEMPORY RHETORIC, supra note 39, at 34.
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and in particular former President Jimmy Carter, were directly respon-
sible for the current inflation, that government regulation is responsible
for the nation's current economic ills, and that current environmental
programs are unjust since trees and volcanoes create as much pollution
as do automobiles."I5 The nation's economic problems have more to
do with the cost of energy and a host of other complicated economic
factors than party politics. And they certainly cannot be attributed to a
single man. Moreover, the statement concerning tree pollution is
plainly false. Trees and volcanoes do not create as much pollution as
human activities. Even if this were not the case, the fact remains that
nature-created pollution does not significantly affect human welfare,
whereas industrial and auto pollution, occurring in the heart of
America's urban centers, poses an immediate threat to public health.'16
As might be expected, the fallacy of distortion is as common to the
legal profession as it is to politics. Briefs often rely on distortions of
opposing arguments, or even distortions of cases themselves. Even
judges have been known to distort the positions of parties to buttress
their own decisions and rationales. In Supreme Court cases involving
more than one opinion it is not uncommon for a dissenting justice to
misrepresent an opinion by the majority or vice versa. Consider the
well known case of Konigsberg v. State Bar of California. 17 Konigs-
berg was denied admission to the California Bar because he refused to
answer questions regarding his alleged prior affiliations with the Com-
munist party. His refusal was based on his belief that the questioning
violated his rights of free speech and association guaranteed by the first
and fourteenth amendments. A majority of the Supreme Court dis-
agreed. However, there was stiff opposition from a four-member mi-
nority. The resulting opinions comprise oft-quoted statements of
115. See 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 811 (Oct. 17, 1980). Reagan's "talk first, qualify later" cam-
paign style left him subject to considerable criticism. Indeed, at one point in the campaign he
refused to speak to the press except from a carefully prepared address. See Meet the RealRonald
Reagan, TIME, October 20, 1980, at 18-27. President Carter, of course, descended to the chal-
lenge, and bandied about more than his share of distortions and gaffes. Carter, for example,
repeatedly characterized Reagan as a "warmonger," eager to do battle with the Soviet Union.
Although Reagan was certainly representing a more conservative foreign policy, such appellations
as "warmonger" and "trigger happy" are plainly exaggerations. See War, Peace and Politics,
TIME, October 6, 1980, at 22, 25.
116. Nature is responsible for about 90 percent of the carbon monoxide in the earth's atmos-
phere, and about 99 percent of all oxides of nitrogen. Sulfur dioxide, however, is almost exclu-
sively the creation of man, as are most hydrocarbons, lead emissions, and particulates. C.
STEWART, AIR POLLUTION, HUMAN HEALTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 7-8 (1979). Reagan's com-
ments concerning volcanoes and auto pollution represent a faulty comparison since the types of
pollution associated with these activities are different. Moreover, that some or even a large por-
tion of pollution occurrences are attributable to natural process does not bear much relevance to
the control of man-made pollution. Whereas there is no way to control natural pollution, man-
made pollution can be regulated. Volcanoes cannot be corked. Smoke stacks can be.
117. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
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opposing views regarding first amendment theory."' Justice Harlan
began the first amendment portion of the majority opinion by re-
marking that the first amendment is not absolute and does not protect
free speech in all circumstances. He indicated that freedom of speech is
not absolute,
not only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protec-
tion exists it must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that
protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First
Amendment .... [Clonstitutionally protected freedom of speech is
narrower than an unlimited license to talk. 119
With this characterization of the so-called absolutist position set forth,
Harlan dealt an easy blow by simply citing the laws of libel, slander,
misrepresentation, and obscenity as examples of the good sense of a
more limited view of the first amendment. 2 ° The trouble with Justice
Harlan's opinion is that it described a view of the first amendment that
no one seriously adhered to, at least not Justice Black, who wrote the
dissenting opinion. 2 ' Not even Justice Black considered the first
amendment to be an "unlimited license to talk." Yet when Justice
Black took the majority to task he succumbed to the same sort of dis-
tortion that Justice Harlan did. The dissenting opinion characterized
the majority holding as "a sweeping denial of the existence of any ina-
lienable right to speak... ,,"22 something that Justice Harlan's opin-
ion never came close to saying. Just because Justice Harlan said that
the first amendment did not guarantee the right of free speech in all
cases, it does not necessarily follow, as the dissent plainly stated of the
majority opinion, that the first amendment never provides unassailable
protection. If only lawyers and judges could direct their attention to
the actual arguments at issue and not some straw creations to be nim-
bly jousted, cases would likely be easier to decide. Decisions would be
easier to understand. And opinions would certainly be much shorter in
length.
CONCLUSION
Logic is not the answer to all of the difficulties of learning legal rea-
soning. The process of legal problem solving is rich with complexities
and considerations that logic simply cannot comprehend. It is a very
human, creative process. And yet logic cannot be left out. There is
much to legal reasoning that is quite logical, and attempts to describe
118. See, e.g., Meilejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245.
119. 366 U.S. at 49-50.
120. Id. at 49 n.10.
121. Id. at 56.
122. Id. at 67.
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legal reasoning as an allogical process ignore the facts and leave little
that is clear and understandable in logic's place. Logic is an inextrica-
ble part of legal reasoning. The process of analogization for instance is
crucial to legal problem solving. It is also an indispensible tool in en-
suring that legal reasoning is correct. No one should have much faith
in a system of laws that was not applied with consistency and predict-
ability. And what is logic-for example the rules of deduction or the
avoidance of common fallacies-except a series of rules to ensure con-
sistency and predictability in problem solving? The principles of logic,
at least the very basics, can and should be emphasized in legal educa-
tion and in the legal profession as a whole. The students will under-
stand legal reasoning with greater ease and clarity, their work will be
performed with greater attention to consistency and critical analysis.
And when they become lawyers the quality of their problem solving
abilities should be improved and enhanced.
